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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HOUSE TO HOUSE: MERGERS, ANNEXATIONS & THE RACIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF CITY-COUNTY POLITICS IN ST. LOUIS

ANDERS WALKER*
INTRODUCTION
For three weeks in August 2014, the unremarkable hamlet of Ferguson,
Missouri exploded. Sparks flew first on August 9, when a white police officer
shot an unarmed black teenager in broad daylight, prompting a coterie of
witnesses to provide a kaleidoscopic portrait of what appeared to be a struggle,
an attempted escape, a possible surrender, and a gruesome crime scene, all of
which stoked outrage in the local, predominantly African American
community. As angry crowds gathered on Ferguson’s streets, county police
responded with an overwhelming show of force, prompting almost two weeks
of night battles, lootings, police reinforcements, anarchist provocations, media
arrests, and international outrage.
Though media attention coalesced around several key issues, including
police militarization and the infringement of First Amendment rights, the
sound cannons and tear gas obscured a larger, more structural matter
implicated in the Ferguson debacle, namely the divide between St. Louis City
and St. Louis County, the latter boasting beleaguered Ferguson but also more
upscale environs like Clayton, its affluent, arguably indifferent county seat.
Though outsiders tend to conflate the county with the city, the two were
separated in the 1870s, to dramatic effect. As part of St. Louis County,
Ferguson belongs to a population demographic that is majority white, while
neighboring St. Louis City is majority black. Both function as parallel
universes, each with their own county offices, including their own health
departments, their own prosecutor, their own sheriff’s department, and—
somewhat uniquely—their own chief of police.
Such redundancies prompted reformers as early as the 1920s to argue that
the city and the county should merge, partly to save on inefficiencies but also
to accomplish a variety of other coincident objectives aimed at regional
development and economic growth. Usually, such efforts have leaned towards
arguments that the city reenter the county, surrendering its county offices to
Clayton. However, minority concerns about prosecutorial insensitivity and
* Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law, PhD Yale University 2003, JD Duke
University 1998, BA Wesleyan University 1994.
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police excess in Ferguson raise the larger question of whether St. Louis City
and St. Louis County should, in fact, be merged and, if so, whether one form of
merger or another would better serve the black community, preventing future
conflagrations from compromising the region’s reputation.
Incidentally, this is not simply a local issue. The fate of consolidation in St.
Louis bears directly on larger, national narratives, including prevailing
arguments that race relations in the United States have assumed a decidedly
spatial/structural cast since the 1970s, prompted largely by the demise of
southern segregation, or Jim Crow, and the migration, or “flight,” of white
urbanites to suburban enclaves nationwide. 1 According to most scholars, Jim
Crow’s death elevated African Americans even as white departures depressed
them, condemning blacks to isolated neighborhoods, segregated schools, and
crumbling urban cores. 2 To counter such reversals, liberals endorsed the
consolidation of urban and suburban zones, hoping that such moves might
thwart flight, promote integration, and ameliorate the effects of what scholars
began in the 1970s to term “institutional” or “structural” racism. 3 Initially such
efforts focused primarily on schools, but quickly expanded to include other
types of consolidation as well, including the consolidation, or merger, of major
metropolitan areas and surrounding counties. 4
While the rubric of consolidation has tended to enjoy a progressive cast,
certain aspects of metropolitan mergers bode ill for African Americans,
particularly in the area of electoral influence. 5 For example, St. Louis City
boasts a comparative black majority of 47.9% (with whites totaling 46.4% and
Asians 3.1%), while the adjoining county claims only 23.7% African American
residents. As this essay shall demonstrate, full integration of the two entities
would lead blacks to lose significant electoral clout, particularly over county
positions like the prosecutor’s office, leaving them politically weaker across

1. See generally KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN CONSERVATISM (2005); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE
AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996).
2. See generally KRUSE, supra note 1; SUGRUE, supra note 1.
3. See James W. Vander Zanden, Sociological Studies of American Blacks, 14 SOC. Q. 32,
39–40 (1973).
4. Richard W. Campbell et al., Augusta/Richmond County, Georgia: Financial Crisis,
Racial Accomodation, and the Consolidation of Augusta and Richmond, Georgia, in CASE
STUDIES OF CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION: RESHAPING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LANDSCAPE
193, 196 (Suzanne M. Leland & Kurt Thurmaier eds., 2004). See generally Mark S. Rosentraub,
City-County Consolidation and the Rebuilding of Image: The Fiscal Lessons from Indianapolis’s
UniGov Program, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 180 (2000). For works on consolidation generally,
see W.A. ROSENBAUM & G.M. KAMMERER, AGAINST LONG ODDS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF SUCCESSFUL GOVERNMENTAL CONSOLIDATION (1974); CASE STUDIES OF CITY-COUNTY
CONSOLIDATION: RESHAPING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LANDSCAPE (Suzanne M. Leland &
Kurt Thurmaier eds., 2004).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 70–84; see also Campbell et al., supra note 4, at 195.
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the board. Simple democratic math suggests that elected officials in the newly
consolidated entity would have less reason to venture out of their way to
address black concerns, perhaps inviting more explosive situations like the one
that engulfed Ferguson in August 2014. There, elected officials like St. Louis
County Prosecutor Robert M. McCulloch suffered criticism for alleged bias
against black interests, based in part on his handling of past cases and also his
personal background.
Just because full merger may weaken the influence of black St. Louis,
however, does not mean that more creative approaches to consolidating the
city and county cannot be devised—approaches that still meet important needs
like reversing the region’s narrative of demographic decline and averaging its
crime rates, both major impediments to outside investment and economic
growth. One such approach, as this article shall demonstrate, is a borough
model—a form of merger similar to that adopted by New York in the
nineteenth century, effectively preserving county structures as metropolitan
boroughs. Pursuant to such a plan, the city would become one borough of St.
Louis and the county another, with all parallel governmental functions intact.
To illustrate how this might work, this article will proceed in four parts. Part I
shall demonstrate how race came to animate city-county relations in St. Louis,
beginning with the initial division of the two in 1876, following the Civil War.
Part II carries the story forward through the twentieth century, again
demonstrating how city-county relations bore and continue to bear distinctly
racial implications. Part III discusses a possible route to consolidation that
takes voting patterns into account, meanwhile lowering crime rates and
reversing St. Louis’s reputation for racial tension and demographic decline.
I. BACKGROUND
The story behind the city-county split in St. Louis began with the Civil
War. Leading up to the conflict, Missouri’s population proved deeply divided
on questions of slavery and regional loyalty, as pro-slavery Missourians
engaged anti-slavery Missourians in the 1850s, many crossing the border into
Kansas to influence elections on slavery in that state. 6 Among slavery’s
foremost supporters was Governor Claiborne Jackson, who expressed clear
sympathy for the South during his gubernatorial campaign in 1860 and, once
elected, quickly began to work for secession. 7 In May 1861, Jackson and his
fellow secessionists decided to force the issue by seizing St. Louis in a
military-style coup, presenting the people of Missouri with a sudden, surprise
marriage to the slave South. 8 One obstacle, however, proved the federal
6. See JAMES NEAL PRIMM, LION OF THE VALLEY: ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, 1764-1980, at
229–30 (3d ed. 1998).
7. Id. at 231–32.
8. See id. at 236–37.
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arsenal, which was occupied by Union troops and housed one of the largest
assemblages of weapons, particularly rifles, in the nation. 9 In mid-April,
Jackson wrote Confederate President Jefferson Davis, requesting heavy
artillery to breach the establishment’s walls. 10 Two weeks later, Jackson called
out the pro-Confederate Missouri Volunteer Militia for “maneuvers” near St.
Louis, including the establishment of an operating base christened “Camp
Jackson” roughly four miles northwest of the arsenal. 11 On May 9, the
southern steamer J.C. Swon delivered two twelve-pound howitzers, two thirtytwo-pound siege guns, and five hundred muskets in crates marked “Tamoroa
marble” to the Rebels, all munitions that had been captured from the federal
arsenal at Baton Rouge. 12 Jackson supporters met the shipment at the St. Louis
riverfront, transported it to Camp Jackson, and commenced preparations for
their assault. 13 However, Union Army Captain Nathaniel Lyon, in charge of
defending the arsenal, suspected a Confederate ambush and called for local
volunteers to march on the Rebel camp and arrest the Confederate force—
which they promptly did. 14
Shortly thereafter, Missouri’s government split. 15 Claiborne Jackson
moved the state capital to Arkansas, gained admission into the Confederacy,
and seceded from the Union. 16 Meanwhile, pro-Union forces declared Jackson
a traitor and established their own, separate government at Jefferson City,
accepted by Lincoln. 17 Missouri’s pro-Union government purged all proConfederate forces through a “test oath” and quickly succumbed to “Radical”
Republicans who called for immediate emancipation, no compensation to
former slave owners, and federal Reconstruction of the South. 18 Radicals
dominated the Constitutional Convention of 1865, ousting non-Radical
officials across the state and installing Radicals in their place, a purge that
swept St. Louis County but failed to sweep the city. 19 St. Louis City became
“the center of opposition” to Radical rule, ministers and priests refused to take
an oath required by Radical government, arguing that it infringed on freedom
of religion, and a moderate coalition, led by the Conservative Union Party,
prevailed. 20

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id. at 234.
See id. at 235.
See id. at 235–36.
See PRIMM, supra note 6, at 236.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 240.
Id.
Id.
See PRIMM, supra note 6, at 245.
See id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263–65.
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However, Radicals used state control of city politics, particularly the police
board, to exercise influence over St. Louis residents. Police exercised power in
part by controlling vice in the city, forcing owners of brothels and “gambling
houses” to pay bribes to stay in business, transforming such locales into
Radical political bases. At such establishments, located near the riverfront, St.
Louis citizens and “visitors from other cities” gathered in a local
“entertainment district” that featured saloons and houses of prostitution with
names like “Jenny Burke’s Almond Street den” and “Madame LaSelle’s den of
infamy.” 21 Radicals further increased their power by increasing the number of
wards in St. Louis from ten to twelve, a move aimed to give Radicals a seat on
the city council, meanwhile creating “a number of new city boards all
appointed by the governor.” 22
In 1867, the state legislature transferred the power to assess and collect the
city’s taxes to the “Radical Republican” county court, part of an effort to
punish anti-Radicalism in the city. 23 The court was dominated by rural
republicans who “collected $1.875 million from city taxpayers while the city
only collected $302,000,” primarily “from licenses and fees.” 24 By 1870, calls
for reform reached a fever pitch as city residents divided into three groups: (1)
those who favored increased representation of the city on the county court, (2)
those who wanted consolidation of the city and county, and (3) those who
wanted to separate the city from the county. 25 In 1873, Democrats outvoted
Radicals and gained control of the state, opening the door for concessions to
the anti-Radical city, ultimately turning the tables on remaining Radical
strongholds like St. Louis County. 26 Given the corruption that had
accompanied the pro-Radical police board, many argued that separating the
city from the county would clean up government. 27 Others argued that
separation would provide for more control of city tax dollars, which was
undeniably true. 28 Finally, proponents of separating the city and the county
argued that administering the entire county would be unwieldy. 29
The door to a separation between city and county first became a legal
possibility with the Constitutional Convention of 1875 that “authorized the city
and county to elect thirteen freeholders, who were to write a city charter,
separate the two governments, define the new boundaries, reorganize the

21. Jeffrey S. Adler, Streetwalkers, Degraded Outcasts, and Good-for-Nothing Huzzies:
Women and the Dangerous Class in Antebellum St. Louis, 25 J. SOC. HIST. 737, 741–43 (1992).
22. PRIMM, supra note 6, at 265.
23. Id. at 299.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 300.
27. Id. at 298–99.
28. PRIMM, supra note 6, at 299.
29. Id.
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county government, and settle outstanding financial differences.” The
freeholders followed suit, achieving separation two years later, in 1877. 30 At
the time, no other city had achieved quite the same rift that St. Louis did,
effectively converting the city into its own municipal county. 31
Several lessons follow. First, the particular pressures that led to the initial
city-county split in 1876 have long since vanished into the mists of history;
Radical Republicans are long gone, battles over Reconstruction are dead, and
alliances between the Democratic Party and white supremacy in the South are
no more. However, a few scattered reverberations remain. For example, just as
frustration with overtaxation led some to support a split in the 1870s, so too
might tax issues rear their head again, particularly if consolidation plans
include adjustments to property taxes, earnings taxes, and so on. Not only
might St. Louisans object to higher taxes, but so too might they object to
adjustments in how those taxes are spent, particularly if control over local
money is moved either east or west along Interstate 64. Further, the question of
taxation contains within it the larger issue of where, precisely, the nexus of
power might be postconsolidation. If the City of St. Louis gains political power
over the county, for example, that is likely to dampen county support for a
merger, just as city support would likely decrease if the locus of decisionmaking were removed from Tucker and Chestnut to Clayton. One obvious
conclusion to be drawn from this is that a merger plan maintaining local tax
structures as they are, and local zones of influence where they are, is perhaps
more likely to succeed than a radical rethinking of political offices,
governmental entities, and tax rates—independent of questions of race.
Precisely such a plan can be found in what Part IV of this article terms the
“borough model.” However, it is first worth reviewing early efforts to undo the
city-county divide before inquiring into what precisely that model might entail.
II. EARLY EFFORTS TO MERGE
Though support for the city-county split remained high through the end of
the nineteenth century, critics began to complain in the early twentieth that the
two entities should be reattached, fueled by “questions of health, crime,
transportation, and public welfare,” all “growing out of the development of
30. Id. at 309.
31. Truman Port Young, The Scheme of Separation of City and County Governments in St.
Louis – Its History and Purposes, 8 PROC. AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, 97, 97 (1912); DON PHARES, ST.
LOUIS PLANS: THE IDEAL AND THE REAL ST. LOUIS 55–56 (Mark Tranel ed., 2007); see
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN ORGANIZATION:
THE ST. LOUIS CASE 15 (1988) [hereinafter METROPOLITAN ORGANIZATION]. For more on the
“borough model,” see LANA STEIN, ST. LOUIS POLITICS: THE TRIUMPH OF TRADITION 109–10
(2002) (describing the 1961 “Borough Plan to Revitalize St. Louis,” which called for twenty-two
boroughs to be created within the new combined city-county jurisdiction—eight in the city and
seven in the county, with an additional seven spanning the boundary between the two).
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urban conditions in county communities adjacent to the city, some of which
possessed no municipal government.” 32 Subsequent merger efforts arose in
1926, 1930, 1954, 1955, 1959, and 1962—often promoted by the city’s
“business elite.” 33 Complicating such efforts, however, was a dramatic inmigration of African Americans to the city from Deep South states like
Mississippi and Louisiana seeking work and relief from white terrorism in the
1950s and 60s, coincident with a dramatic out-migration of white families
from the city to the surrounding county at roughly the same time. 34 Though
African Americans would themselves migrate to the county in smaller
numbers—hence the demographics of county municipalities like Ferguson—
black voting power remained concentrated in the city, yielding a racialized
landscape that followed city-county lines even as it coincided with concerns
among city residents that city-county consolidation would “diminish” their
“sovereignty” by removing government “further from the people,” presumably
west towards the Clayton county seat. 35
Evidence that the business elite did in fact consider removing political
power from the city emerged prominently in the 1980s, when Civic Progress—
a cadre of the city’s most prominent business leaders—hired St. Louis law firm
Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts (“Bryan Cave”) to research the
feasibility of merging the city and county, meanwhile leaving the nexus of
political control in the county. 36 In 1984, Bryan Cave issued a report aiming
“to combine the multiplicity of governmental units now operating in the
territory of the City and the County into a single entity.” 37 The report
advocated the termination of “[t]he separate existence of the various
municipalities in the County,” along with “the separate existence of the various
fire districts.” 38 However, in a manner that would have profoundly impacted
black political clout, the county was to become the predominant governing
body, with the “surviving entity retain[ing] the fundamental structure of the
present government and charter of the county.” 39 To this effect, the
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, the Junior College District of St. Louis-

32. Isidor Loeb, The Proposed Merger of St. Louis City and County, 24 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
691, 691 (1930).
33. Id. at 691–92; see also BRYAN, CAVE, MCPHEETERS & MCROBERTS, LEGAL
FEASIBILITY STUDY OF THE COMBINATION OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS 2–3 (Dec.
21, 1984), available at stlworldclasscity.com/pdf/Legal Feasibility Study City County STL.pdf
[hereinafter BRYAN CAVE STUDY]; see also STEIN, supra note 31, at 107–08.
34. COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN CITY
4 (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008).
35. STEIN, supra note 31, at 108.
36. BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 1–2.
37. Id. at 3–4.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id.
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St. Louis County, the Metropolitan Zoological Park and Museum District, and
the various school districts in the city and the county would remain intact while
other services, including the circuit attorney’s office, would go to the county. 40
Rather than make St. Louis City the new county seat, the plan tilted heavily
towards increasing the county’s influence over the city, a move that echoed
earlier tensions between the two entities in the 1870s. 41
Though written with a pro-county slant, Bryan Cave’s report remains the
best exploration to date of the legal intricacies of city-county consolidation,
providing numerous clues into the potential implications that a merger might
have on race. For example, Bryan Cave demonstrated that critical to merging
the city and the county is Article VI Section 30 of the Missouri Constitution,
which requires the appointment of a “board of freeholders” to propose changes
in the city-county relationship—changes that must then be approved by a
majority of voters in both the city and the county. 42 Hence, any plan aimed at a
city-county merger will likely require substantial black support in the city, an
unlikely event if said plan promises to substantially diminish black political
power. Incidentally, the track record of freeholder boards is not particularly
good: one was appointed in 1925 to contemplate a consolidation of the city and
the county but failed, another was appointed in 1953 to create a metropolitan
sewer district and succeeded, yet another was formed that same year to create a
metropolitan transit district but failed, and finally a board was conjured in 1958
to consolidate various city-county functions like land use planning, which also
failed. 43 In 1962, proponents of merging the city and the county attempted to
circumvent the boards of freeholders entirely by amending Section 30 of the
Missouri Constitution to eliminate them, but did not succeed. 44 In 1962 and
1971, reformers went to Jefferson City again, this time to enact state legislation
authorizing the Junior College District of St. Louis-St. Louis County and the
Metropolitan Zoological Park and Museum District, both of which enjoyed
some state purchase. 45
Circumventing freeholders and going directly to state government arguably
poses a threat to African American majorities in St. Louis, not least because
any plan aimed at full consolidation and concomitant vote dilution would

40. Id. at 1–2, 60.
41. On the termination of municipalities, the study pondered whether Section 30 authorizes
“adoption of a plan which would terminate the continued existence of the various municipalities
in the County, without a separate vote of the residents of each municipality.” Id. at 12.
42. BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 2, 14–15.
43. Id. at 2–3.
44. Id. at 3 (citing FRANK S. SANGSTOCK, CONSOLIDATION: BUILDING A BRIDGE BETWEEN
CITY AND SUBURB 12–26 (1964)).
45. Id. at 3–4; See FAIRBANK, MASLIN, METZ & ASSOCIATES, ST. LOUIS CITY AND ST.
LOUIS COUNTY UNIFICATION SURVEY 1–2 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.stlworldclasscit
y.com/pdf/Executive%20Summary%20September%202012%20poll.pdf.
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theoretically be more likely to survive this route. However, the path is
heretofore unpaved. It is unlikely, for example, that rural voters would or could
be moved to support a merger simply because it benefitted residents of the St.
Louis metro area. It is also unlikely that a merger could be pitched in terms
that would clearly advantage voters in remote parts of the state, save perhaps to
amplify their voice in the state legislature, a move that might be achieved by
diluting city votes. Given the more conservative cast of rural Missouri, for
example, it is at least conceivable that a conservative drive to dilute the liberal
voting power of the city by merging it with the county could garner rural
attention. However, the county is itself majority Democrat, which means that
merging the two may have little transformative effect.
Further, merging the city and county expressly to dilute minority voting
power is unlikely to survive constitutional review, as Part III of this article
shall discuss. 46 It is therefore reasonable to assume that proponents of this
route are unlikely to make any mention of race, whether their intentions are
racially motivated or not. After all, dilution of the city’s voting power remains
perhaps the most explosive issue affiliated with consolidation, one most
proponents of a full merger are likely to deemphasize. 47
Amendment options aside, the Missouri Constitution currently “provides
five alternative ways” to adjust the relationship between the city and the
county. 48 The first three were approved in 1924 and include the consolidation
“of the City and County into one public subdivision under the municipal
government of the City,” “reentry of the City into the County,” and
“[a]nnexation of portions of the County by the City.” 49 The fourth approach,
approved in 1945, provides for the “establishment of metropolitan districts for
the provision of services in the area,” while the fifth approach, sanctioned in
1966, allows for “[a]ny other plan for the partial or complete government of all
or any part of the City and the County.” 50 This latter “fifth power” provides the
most opportunity for creative restructuring and, perhaps for that very reason,
proved to be of particular interest to Bryan Cave in 1984, arguably authorizing
“development of a plan in which the County forms the basis for a new

46. Precisely such an annexation occurred in Richmond, Virginia. As Bryan Cave notes,
“[t]he city annexed adjacent territory which increased the number of whites in the city by 32%
and the number of blacks by just over 1%, thus transforming the former black majority into a
42% minority. Thereafter, Richmond implemented a single-member district plan which promised
to produce four black councilmen on a nine-member council.” While this amounted to a
substantial dilution of black power in the city, the annexation survived a Supreme Court
challenge brought under the 1965 Voting Rights Act. BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 18
(citing City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 367–68 (1975)).
47. Id. at 17–20.
48. Id. at 9–10.
49. Id. at 10.
50. Id.
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governmental unit” incorporating the city. 51 While subject to judicial review,
Section 30 grants a remarkable amount of discretion to appointed freeholders
whose plans “shall take the place of and supersede all laws, charter provisions,
and ordinances inconsistent therewith relating to said territory.” 52
Adopting an expansive reading of Section 30’s fifth power, Bryan Cave
recommended consolidation of the city and the county with final control
residing in the county. 53 Such a “consolidation” drew inspiration from merger
efforts in Indianapolis and Miami. 54 In Miami, reformers proposed a plan to
consolidate the city of Miami with surrounding Dade County, eliminating all
municipalities in the process, only to fail at the polls. Instead, Miami opted for
a new charter that “allowed the county to take over certain municipal services
from the municipalities,” a power provided for in the Florida Constitution. 55
Meanwhile, Indianapolis proposed state legislation that merged the
governments of Indianapolis City with surrounding Marion County, meanwhile
leaving “many municipalities in existence, with some of them being allowed to
continue to provide certain municipal functions.” 56 As governance scholar
Mark Rosentraub describes it, “Indianapolis’s specific contribution to the
experiment in governance models was a city-county consolidation program
that concentrated a limited or select group of urban services at the regional
(defined as county) level while permitting most other critical urban services to
be delivered by administrations and agencies serving different, often much
smaller, areas within the county.” 57 Presumably, Missouri could achieve a
similar result by amending its constitution or proposing state legislation
mimicking the Indiana or Florida plans.
Bryan Cave discouraged state remedies in lieu of adopting an expansive
definition of Section 30: consolidation of the city and county with the resulting
nexus of power resting in the county. 58 Pursuant to this proposal, an appointed
board of freeholders would gather to construct “both a city and a county,” an
arrangement not unlike the current legal status of the city which—though
generally perceived to be separate from the county—is actually a county unto
itself, boasting all of the same services that a county generally provides,
including for example a health department, circuit (district) attorney, and a

51. Id. at 13.
52. BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 10.
53. Id. at 13–14.
54. Id. at 4–5 n.3.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Mark S. Rosentraub, City-County Consolidation and the Rebuilding of Image: The
Fiscal Lessons from Indianapolis’s UniGov Program, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 180, 180
(2000).
58. BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 11, 13–14.
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sheriff’s department. 59 Hence, the true legal landscape of St. Louis is two
counties, one consolidated with the city and one not. 60
Whether Section 30 authorizes the board of freeholders to extinguish a
county is not entirely clear. However, both the section’s fifth power and its
third power (annexation) suggest yes. 61 Either one of the two counties at issue
could annex the other or, as Bryan Cave notes, “full consolidation” of the two
entities could be conducted under Section 30’s fifth power. 62
Arguably more nebulous is the status of the various municipalities within
the county. According to state law, “the merger or consolidation of cities,
towns, and villages” requires “approval of the majority of the voters voting on
the matter in each municipality.” 63 However, Section 30 of the state
constitution provides that “only” a majority of the voters in the city and a
majority of voters in the county need approve a plan of merger or
consolidation. 64 Hence, a majority of voters in the county could theoretically
outnumber majorities in individual municipalities, provided the plan called for
the extinction of independent municipalities. 65 Of course, the converse could
also be true. If a plan requiring extinction was in fact approved, courts might
decide that Section 30 “should not be read as a grant of authority to affect the
existence of the various municipalities other than pursuant to the established
procedures for consolidation of cities and towns,” meaning that municipalities
remain regardless of what the city and county decide. 66 However, the refusal of
some municipalities to participate in a merger need not kill hopes of
consolidation, as Indianapolis attests. 67 There, four municipalities—Beech
Grove, Lawrence, Southport, and Speedway—all opted out of consolidation,
continuing on as independent entities responsible for their own tax systems and
services. 68

59. Id. at 1, 20, 54–60, 138 app. G n.1.
60. See METROPOLITAN ORGANIZATION, supra note 31, at 34; Thomas H. Reed,
Constitutional Changes Necessary to Accomplish Local Government Reform, 2 LEGAL NOTES ON
LOC. GOV’T 139, 145 (1936) (“[T]he framers of the [Missouri] constitution had entirely omitted
to provide for any process by which a city could annex territory in an adjoining county.”).
61. See BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 11.
62. Id. at 14. The city-county of St. Louis could annex portions, if not all, of the traditional
county of St. Louis, thereby “leaving the City as the nominal surviving entity,” a development
that would effectively extinguish what most St. Louisans currently recognize as the “county.”
According to Bryan Cave, such a move could “more readily resolve some of the uncertainties
which might otherwise arise with respect to the taxing power of the new government.” Id. at 11,
14–15.
63. Id. at 14.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 15.
67. Rosentraub, supra note 4, at 182.
68. Id. at 181.
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III. RACIAL IMPLICATIONS
While merger opponents in St. Louis have traditionally argued that any
form of consolidation would only benefit the city, consolidation could cost the
urban core as well, particularly its African American population. Currently,
African Americans comprise 47.9% of the city’s population, just slightly more
than the city’s white population (46.4%), but substantially more than the
percentage of black county residents (23.7%) and black state residents, who
number only 11.7%. 69 Given the substantially larger percentage of whites in
the county, merging the city and the county could have a sizable impact on
black influence, perhaps even triggering federal scrutiny. Pursuant to Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, for example, any “discriminatory” state
efforts to dilute minority voting power are prohibited. 70 Further, “[m]unicipal
annexations and consolidations [have been] recognized as ‘practices or
procedures’ which can dilute the voting strength of minorities, and thus bring
the provisions of the Act into play,” as was the case in Petersburg, Virginia in
the 1960s. 71 There, city leaders orchestrated a merger that retained
governmental control in white hands by annexing a heavily white area to the
city proper, substantially reducing black electoral influence within city
bounds. 72 Other courts have held that violations of Section 5 may occur
whether or not consolidation is conducted expressly to dilute minority voting
power, as happened in Petersburg. 73 Assume, for example, that a local
initiative aimed at consolidating electoral districts for the purpose of advancing
business investment reduced black voting power. Such a measure could,
pursuant to Section 2, activate federal scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act,
granting a federal judge the power to strike down the consolidation plan. 74 To
do so, a judge would need to find that black voting power dropped below the

69. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS: ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29510.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2014); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS: ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, http://quickfacts.cen
sus.gov/qfd/states/29/29189.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
70. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C §1973 (2012).
71. BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 18 (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156 (1980); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 367–68 (1975); Perkins v.
Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388–90 (1971); City of Petersburg, Va. v. United States, 354 F. Supp.
1021, 1028 n.16 (D.D.C. 1972), aff’d, 410 U.S. 462 (1973)).
72. City of Petersburg, Va., 354 F. Supp. at 1028 n.16.
73. Taylor v. Haywood County, Tenn., 544 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
Congress expressly removed any requirement of intent from Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
effectively providing a federal cause of action whenever state action substantially diluted a
minority’s voting power. Id.
74. Id.; City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 156; City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371; Perkins, 400 U.S.
at 388–90; City of Petersburg, Va., 354 F. Supp. at 1028 n.16.
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proportionate number of African Americans in the community. 75 If, for
example, African Americans comprised 30% of the total population
postconsolidation, then their voting power would need to be commensurate to
this new number. 76 In other words, black voting rights can be diluted and still
survive constitutional review so long as the resulting power differential
remains in line with the percentage of total voters that African Americans
comprise in the new consolidated entity. 77 To illustrate, if blacks find their
voting power reduced from 47.9% to 30% due to consolidation, such a
reduction remains constitutional provided that black elected officials constitute
30% of the newly consolidated leadership. Precisely such an outcome occurred
in Richmond, Virginia. 78
Richmond’s efforts to preserve black representation on the city council
successfully avoided the outcome in the Petersburg case, where consolidation
was followed by the creation of an at-large district. 79 For precisely this reason,
Bryan Cave recommended that “equality of representation, and thus
apportionment based on population, be the starting point and controlling
criterion in deriving election districts.” 80 Pursuant to the Bryan Cave study, the
city’s electoral wards were to be abandoned in favor of townships—each ward
constituting one township. “It is presently intended,” noted Bryan Cave, “to
retain existing townships in the County and eliminate wards in the City. 81
Presumably, the wards will be replaced with townships similar in organization
to those in the County.” 82 While it is uncertain how a township model might be
structured to provide for a guarantee that black voting power remain
proportionate to the population, even if said proportion were achieved, blacks
would quickly find their votes diluted by merger. 83 Such a dilution, to the
detriment of African Americans in St. Louis, would be perfectly constitutional
so long as black representation remained in line with the total ratio of blacks to
whites in the larger, postconsolidation community. 84
75. Taylor, 544 F. Supp. at 1134; City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 156; City of Richmond, 422 U.S.
at 367–68; Perkins, 400 U.S. at 388–90; City of Petersburg, Va., 354 F. Supp. at 1028 n.16.
76. City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371.
77. Id. at 372.
78. Id. at 371–72.
79. City of Petersburg, Va., 354 F. Supp. at 1023.
80. BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 65.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS: ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29510.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2014); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS: ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, http://quickfacts.cen
sus.gov/qfd/states/29/29189.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
84. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 367–68 (1975). A final sector where
African Americans might suffer under a city-county merger is jobs. As Bryan Cave envisioned it,
a “plan of combination can provide for the early termination of elected or appointed offices in the
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Of course, reducing African Americans from an electoral majority to an
electoral minority in St. Louis need not automatically harm black interests;
after all the city has long boasted a white mayor adept enough at addressing
majority black concerns to enjoy repeated reelection. 85 However, recent events
in Ferguson suggest that certain issues may warrant particular attention to race,
among them the diversity of police departments and the election of county
prosecutors. In the case of the latter, St. Louis County Prosecutor Bob
McCulloch drew criticism from local black leaders, including Ferguson
Counilwoman Patricia Bynes, St. Louis County Executive Charlie Dooley,
Missouri Senator Jamilah Nasheed, St. Louis Alderman Antonio French, and
Missouri Congressman Lacy Clay for refusing to recuse himself from the
Wilson case. 86 While McCulloch may have had good reason not to step aside,
black leaders took issue with his past, arguing that he had mishandled past
cases and that his father’s murder at the hands of a black killer prevented him
from being impartial. Though McCulloch’s loss of his father was arguably
irrelevant to the case at hand, the prosecutor proved unable to quell black
dissent, even after he assigned the case to subordinates (one of whom was
African American), and then left the decision whether or not to indict to a
grand jury. 87
White voters seemed more supportive, a fact that became apparent when
Governor Jay Nixon endorsed McCulloch’s actions in the wake of the Brown
shooting by declaring county prosecutors to be “pillars of democracy.” 88 By
flaunting McCulloch and flouting black discontents, Nixon revealed the critical
importance that racial demographics played in local prosecutions. Himself
beholden to the state’s overwhelming white majority, Nixon understood better
than anyone how democratic pressures might demand a measured approach to
the prosecution of Darren Wilson. After all, even if McCulloch secretly
sympathized with Ferguson’s black demonstrators, his job did not hinge on
their votes. More important to his survival was white sentiment, which
City, the municipalities in the County and the other political subdivisions which will be
consolidated with the County.” BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 75.
85. Recent evidence indicates that the number of white voting age residents actually
outnumbers blacks, 49% to 45%. See Alex Ihnen, Understanding St. Louis: Wards, Race & Votes
for Treasurer, NEXTSTL, Aug. 13, 2012, http://nextstl.com/2012/08/understanding-st-louis-wards
-race-votes-for-treasurer/. For Francis Slay’s rise to power, see STEIN, supra note 31, at 245.
86. Kimberly Kindy, Objectivity of Prosecutor in Missouri Shooting of Michael Brown is
Questioned, WASH. POST, August 15, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/objectivityof-prosecutor-in-missouri-shooting-of-michael-brown-is-questioned/2014/08/15/1fe20690-24bc11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story.html.
87. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 31, at 239 (discussing Freeman Boseley’s attention to black
issues as mayor in the 1990s).
88. Governor Nixon Refuses to Name Special Prosecutor in Brown Shooting Case,
FOX2NOW, Aug. 21, 2014, http://fox2now.com/2014/08/21/senator-nasheed-delivers-mccollochpetition-for-his-removal/.
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appeared increasingly frustrated with black demands, particularly after
authorities released a video of Brown brazenly robbing a convenience store
immediately before encountering Darren Wilson. Further, whites seemed
relatively unconcerned that McCulloch himself had lost his father to a black
killer, an issue that was ostensibly irrelevant but that many black leaders
continued to cite as evidence of prosecutorial bias.
To conclude, the county’s racial demographics played a subtle yet
structural role in the Darren Wilson-Michael Brown case. Given the black
community’s suspicions of McCulloch, it is unlikely that he would ever have
been elected prosecutor in a majority black district, like St. Louis City. It is
also unlikely that he would have kept his job in St. Louis City, as became clear
during subsequent county council meetings where blacks aired their
frustrations at his arguably glacial response to events. However, McCulloch’s
job did not hinge on black choice. Because the county was majority white,
McCulloch could not risk creating the appearance that he was catering to
Michael Brown, particularly as media portrayals morphed Brown into a violent
felon.
Conversely, had Brown been shot by an officer in the city, things may well
have been different. St. Louis City Prosecutor Jennifer Joyce, who also
happens to be white, relies heavily on black votes for support. Her background
lacks the anti-black cast that besets McCulloch, even as her career hinges on
appearing more sensitive to black concerns than McCulloch. Even if the
outcome was the same, in other words, Joyce would arguably be better
equipped, and more incentivized, to address and engage the black
community—precisely because blacks wield more power inside the city limits.
IV. THE BOROUGH MODEL
Assuming that blacks will lose influence under a full merger, what are
possible strategies for achieving consolidation that are likely to garner African
American support? More precisely, how might the concentration of black
voting power currently present in the city be preserved, meanwhile
consolidating those aspects of city-county government that are least likely to
disparately impact citizens based on their race? One answer, which the
remainder of this article shall explore, might be a borough model, not unlike
that found in New York where five separate boroughs—Manhattan, Kings,
Queens, Bronx, and Staten Island—also double as separate counties. 89
Note, New York’s model differs considerably from an earlier “Borough
Plan” introduced in St. Louis in 1961. 90 That plan called for a full merger of

89. Gary L. Heinmiller, Craft Masonry in Manhattan, New York County, New York, Vol. II,
Lodge Nos. 202 thru 287, at 2–3 (2011).
90. STEIN, supra note 31, at 109–110.
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the city and the county, followed by the creation of a mind-boggling “twentytwo boroughs,” eight of which were to be in the city and “seven in the county,
with an additional seven spanning the boundary between the two.” 91 Rather
than keep county office structures intact, as this article proposes, the 1961 plan
sought to consolidate “[a]ll existing governmental bodies,” a move that won
virtually no popular support. 92
Rather than create twenty-two boroughs, this article proposes two: the
borough of the city and the borough of the county. Both would exist essentially
as they do now, with their own municipal governments and their own county
offices. Further, electoral politics would remain largely the same: African
Americans would retain power in the borough of the city, while whites would
remain a sizable majority in the borough of the county. However, both would
be united by a dual executive made up of the mayor of the city and the county
executive, who would together possess only limited powers over services that
have essentially already been merged, like the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer
District and the Metropolitan St. Louis Transit Authority. With relatively little
political upheaval, statistics relevant to the region’s reputation could be
averaged, the population number of both boroughs added, and the crime rate
reduced.
Already, the city and county police departments have requested that they
be viewed as essentially merged by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 93
According to a petition signed by St. Louis City Chief Sam Dotson and former
St. Louis County Chief Tim Fitch, for example, the St. Louis Metropolitan
Police Department (SLMPD) and the St. Louis County Police Department
(SLCPD) “increasingly share law enforcement services and investigations
across a diluted city/county line” including “police air support, bomb and arson
response, a terrorism and disaster fusion center, licensing/training for private
security personnel, and mass transit security.” 94 “Most importantly,” noted the
two chiefs, “the SLMPD and SLCPD Chiefs have agreed to cross-deputize all
sworn personnel of the two agencies.” 95 Such joint ventures underscore the
feasibility of retaining two departments in two boroughs that, at the same time,
operate within one larger city unit. 96
Merging crime data in the borough of the city and the borough of the
county would echo, though not imitate outright, New York’s system, where a
mayor and city council exercise control over services that stretch across the

91. Id.
92. Id. at 110.
93. Rick Rosenfeld Proposal, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2013, http://www.stlto
day.com/rick-rosenfeld-proposal/pdf_6452897b-cda6-5241-88d4-624c60b07bd6.html.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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city, including police, fire, sanitation, city planning, and transportation. 97
However, each New York borough retains distinct political functions,
including their own prosecutors and public defenders. 98 Further, borough
presidents are tasked with reviewing land use decisions, presiding over
community boards, working with the mayor to prepare an annual budget, and
representing the borough’s interests to the mayor’s office and the city
council. 99
Though New York’s structure is relatively centralized around the mayor,
St. Louis’s version need not be. For example, proponents of decentralization in
New York gained traction in the 1990s when the borough of Staten Island
attempted to secede—a move eerily reminiscent of St. Louis’s city-county
split. 100 Tired of high taxes and poor services, a majority of Staten Island
voters agreed to abandon the city proper in November 1993. 101 To their
dismay, however, a state supreme court judge stymied the rebellion by holding
that the secession needed to be approved by New York’s city council, setting
the stage for a settlement between the rogue borough and newly elected mayor
Rudolph Giuliani, who endorsed some decentralization. 102 Following the
“Staten Island secession,” as it came to be known, “New York’s outer
boroughs” endorsed a series of “proposals for giving more authority to
boroughs and local communities.” 103 St. Louis could embody precisely the
type of decentralized borough structure that New York has sought to achieve.
The same is true of Los Angeles; reformers there lobbied for a
decentralized borough model of government in 2002, declaring that “a broad
range of powers can be vested in boroughs, allowing decisions with a
decidedly local impact (for example street maintenance and street policing)” to
be handled at the local level. 104 While opponents countered that
decentralization would impinge on the economies of scale achieved by
consolidation, borough-backers cited evidence suggesting the opposite, namely
that “economies of scale are limited to 50,000 to 200,000 residents,” and that

97. Heinmiller, supra note 89, at 3.
98. See, e.g., Office of the Bronx District Attorney: Organizational Structure, BRONX D.A.,
http://bronxda.nyc.gov/frames.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
99. See, e.g., Borough President’s Duties, BROOKLYN USA, http://www.brooklyn-usa.org/
pages/faq.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
100. Robert D. McFadden, Staten Island Secession, the Debate that Wouldn’t Die, Now
Reaches Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at B3.
101. James Dao, Secession is Approved; Next Move is Albany’s: Staten Island, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1993, at B4.
102. Court Slows S.I. Secession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1995, at B6.
103. Marilyn Blohm et al., Back to the Boroughs: Reinventing New York’s Governments,
CITY J., Spring 1993, http://www.city-journal.org/printable.php?id=1506.
104. Ronald Oakerson & Shirley Svorny, Rightsizing Los Angeles, 9 INDEP. REV. 513, 518
(2005).
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further consolidations only lead to inefficiency and waste. 105 Urban scholars
Ronald Oakerson and Shirley Svorny go so far as to suggest that “[e]conomies
of scale vary across the range of services that city governments provide. Some
services, such as police patrols, exhaust economies of scale relatively quickly.
Others, such as pollution control efforts, benefit from larger regional actions.
For most public services, economies of scale are exhausted fairly rapidly as
cities grow in size.” 106 In fact, some have argued that consolidation can itself
lead to urban decline. As Oakerson and Svorny observe, for example, “large
cities suffer for the most part from collective inaction on a plethora of local
collective problems. This neglect occurs because officials who operate at an
extremely larger scale have little incentive to deal with problems that people
who operate at a smaller scale find important. Such problems are often
considered petty—a nuisance to public officials and too trivial to command
their attention. The deterioration of cities derives primarily from the
accumulation of such petty problems that go unsolved.” 107
A decentralized borough model in St. Louis could address the concerns
about overcentralization and indifference that Oakerson and Svorny identify—
concerns that exploded in L.A. in 2002, when a secessionist movement argued
for partition of San Fernando Valley from the rest of the city, sparking a larger
interest in devolving power to local units, some secessionists even proposing
that “governing functions over neighborhood matters should be formally
decentralized into a system of boroughs, in which local areas have significant
governing authority, particularly over land use.” 108 Over 50% of the valley’s
voters agreed, but were subsequently thwarted by a larger majority of voters in
the other sections of the city. 109 However, complaints that the city of Los
Angeles was unresponsive to the concerns of voters in the Valley remained. 110
St. Louis could not only learn from Los Angeles and New York but could
provide the blueprint for precisely the type of decentralized borough structure
that reformers there have sought, avoiding the dangers of overconsolidation by
moving towards a loosely organized, local-sensitive system of municipal
government. Pursuant to this model, little of the city and county’s current
governmental structure need change. Even the question of who would preside
over the newly created entity could be addressed by simply endorsing a dual
executive, with the city mayor and county executive presiding over a very
105. Id. at 516.
106. Id. at 515–16.
107. Id. at 519.
108. RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, LOS ANGELES: STRUCTURE OF A CITY GOVERNMENT 194
(2006).
109. Rick Orlov, Secession Drive Changed San Fernando Valley, Los Angeles, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 3, 2012, http://www.dailynews.com/20121104/secession-drive-changed-san-fernan
do-valley-los-angeles.
110. Id.
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limited number of regional functions, including those that are already
consolidated, like transportation and sewers, and possibly also police. 111 Such
an arrangement would enable St. Louis to claim a larger population and a more
prominent place in America’s urban pantheon, even as it would enable the city
to average its crime rate with that of the county, taking it permanently off the
most dangerous cities list. 112 Further, adopting a borough approach might help
sidestep the thorny question of whether, under a complete merger, the county
of the city need be legally dissolved. Currently, the city’s dual status as a
county serves as a protective measure—an effort to insulate county officers
from city politics, granting the general assembly a say in local St. Louis
politics. 113 Pursuant to the Missouri Constitution, all county officers are
ultimately regulated by the state legislature, including for example the collector
of revenue. 114 The Missouri Supreme Court has held that “the City cannot, by
amendment of its charter, eliminate the County offices so as to take over local
control” of the county functions within its boundaries. 115 Of course, the
question remains whether a board of freeholders operating under the authority
of Section 30 of the state constitution could abolish the city’s status as an
independent county. A loose reading of Section 30 suggests yes. A strict
reading, however, suggests that the state legislature would have to formally
dissolve the county of the city before the offices therein could be transferred or
terminated. Bryan Cave posited that such a move would be possible were the
city to merge with the county, leaving the nexus of power in the county. 116
However, Bryan Cave failed to address the necessary dissolution of the county
aspect of the city, again something likely to require state approval. An added
wrinkle here is the county of the county’s charter status, a distinction that the
county of the city lacks. Pursuant to Article VI Section 18 of the Missouri
Constitution, “charter counties can provide in their charter for the kind of
salaries of county offices, thus taking over responsibility for such functions
from the legislature.” 117

111. Oakerson & Svorny, supra note 104, at 521. According to proponents of decentralization
in L.A., the move towards consolidation bears a high likelihood of divorcing municipal
governance from voters, in part because “a singular metropolitan government is less suited to
solving the multitude of local problems than is a process of metropolitan governance that
embraces multiple jurisdictions.” Id.
112. Lindsay Toler, St. Louis Named No. 5 Most Dangerous City Because No One Knows
How Statistics Work, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Feb. 5, 2014, http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/dailyrft/
2014/02/st_louis_named_no_5_most_dange.php.
113. BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 44.
114. Id. (citing Preisler v. Hayden, 309 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1958)).
115. Id. (citing Stemmler v. Einstein, 297 S.W.2d 467, 473 (Mo. 1956)).
116. Id. at 45.
117. Id. at 45 n.100 (citing MO. CONST. art. VI, § 18).
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Given the real possibility that a constitutional amendment may be needed
to dissolve the county of the city of St. Louis, it might make sense to simply
leave the county of the county and the county of the city intact, more or less
functioning as independent boroughs within a larger metropolitan unit. Note,
this is different from an earlier borough model proposed for St. Louis in 1961,
which called for “twenty-two boroughs to be created within the new combined
jurisdiction, eight in the city and seven in the county, with an additional seven
spanning the boundary between the two.” 118 It is also different from an even
earlier borough proposal advanced by a Professor Thomas H. Reed in 1930. 119
Charged by a “joint metropolitan development committee” to survey the best
possible way of merging the city and the county, Reed recommended a
“federal, or borough, plan” which would leave “practically intact the
organization of existing municipalities, school districts, and courts, subject to
the power of the legislature to change them in the future.” 120 Presiding over
these units would be a “government of the Greater City, with important powers
relating to health, sewers, highways, public welfare, public utilities, libraries,
parks, recreation, city planning, and elections.” 121 Meanwhile, a “separate
municipal government” was created for the “unincorporated rural territory.” 122
To effect this arrangement, the proposed “plan involved the adoption of an
amendment to the constitution which would authorize the drafting of a charter
for the city of Greater St. Louis, to go into effect when adopted at separate
elections by a majority vote in city and county.” 123
That counties might coordinate functions is already provided for in
Missouri law, as evidenced by the Bi-State Development Agency which, as
Bryan Cave notes, “is already in existence and covers an area broader than
even the City and County,” meanwhile possessing “the power and authority to
perform a number of functions normally performed by a city or county
government.” 124 Another successful example is the Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer District. 125 Already, Missouri law “provides that counties may join in
the performance of common functions,” opening the door for an even more

118. STEIN, supra note 31, at 109–10.
119. Loeb, supra note 32, at 692.
120. Id. at 691–92.
121. Id. at 692.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 46.
125. A borough model was proposed in 1930 but failed. See Aimee Levitt, The Great
Divorce: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About the City/County Split, RIVERFRONT TIMES
POL. BLOG, May 4, 2010, http://blogs.riverfrtonttimes.com/dailyrft/2010/05/the_great_divorce_
everything_you_ever_wanted _to_know_about_the_city_county_split.php (citing Joe Huber, The
History of Possibilities of a St. Louis City-County Reunification (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with Christian Brothers College High School)).
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cooperative borough-type government. 126 Under such a system, the city and
county could conceivably integrate certain services, like the police function,
effectively merging the county police with the municipal police department.
Such coordination would, pursuant to current state law, require “a petition
signed by 8 percent of the voters” in the county of the county and the county of
the city. 127 Other duplicative services that could be coordinated include
“housing, port, and industrial development authorities.” 128
Currently, both the city and the county operate parallel court systems,
including parallel prosecutors’ offices. In a traditional setting, only one
prosecutor would preside over a county, or district, with jurisdiction
throughout that district and a subordinate staff of attorneys to handle the
caseload. Municipal judges, in such a system, remain part of the overall
judicial district, or in the case of St. Louis, the circuit court. As Bryan Cave
noted in 1984, “[c]onsolidation of the circuit courts presents a much more
difficult question” than consolidation of the municipal courts. 129 Conceivably,
consolidation of municipal courts would simply fall under the reigning circuit
court, with little need for state legislation or approval. Part of the reason that
merging circuits would require state approval is the Missouri Constitution,
which provides for state division of Missouri into explicit judicial circuits,
each district comprised of at least one county. 130 To date, the city and the
county of St. Louis each comprise a district—the 21st and the 22nd—meaning
that merging the two would possibly require “legislation by the General
Assembly.” 131 However, Bryan Cave argued in 1984 that any number of
possible mergers could occur between the city and the county without state
legislation, provided that the judicial districts remain the same. Similarly,
“control over the method of selection of judges” also rests with the state. 132
Consequently, Bryan Cave suggested that “it would be more practical to leave
the entire circuit organization intact.” 133 In the event that this did not occur,
and the state authorized the consolidation of the two districts, separate circuit
(prosecuting) attorneys and clerk’s offices could still be maintained, each
operating in their distinct counties. 134 However, it is more likely that the
positions would merge, with either the county of the city or the county of the
county becoming the dominant judicial district. Were the county of the county
to emerge the winner, city residents may find a circuit attorney with a different
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 47 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 70.010 (1978)).
Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 70.020 (1978))
Id. at 51.
Id. at 58.
Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 478.075 (1978)).
Id. at 58–59.
BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 59.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 59 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 56, § 483 (1978)).
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set of prosecutorial objectives, perhaps less sensitive to questions of poverty
and structural inequality than the current office. For this reason, city residents
may have an interest in preserving judicial districts as they are.
Just as Bryan Cave recommended the retention of judicial districts, so too
did the firm recommend the retention of school districts—another indication
that a decentralized approach to merger best fits St. Louis. 135 Presumably, this
was because of the potentially charged nature of school districting questions,
including questions of funding, resources, and race. However, the
recommendation that school districts be left intact heightens the chance that
other districts could also be left intact, like the outstanding judicial districts. As
Bryan Cave notes, for example, Section 30 “contemplates under the fifth
power the possibility that a plan will provide for the partial government of the
territory included within the geographic scope of the plan,” meaning that
“some governmental functions might be left with existing entities.” 136 Yet
another public function that could remain decentralized under such a provision
is land use and zoning, allowing “some control over such matters to remain
with local communities.” 137
Merger of specific functions can also be achieved through state legislation,
pursuant to Section 30 of the state constitution, as happened with the creation
of the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District in 1955. 138 The district was
proposed by a board of freeholders and later approved by voters in the city and
county, providing for “multiple watersheds” and taking over “existing sewers,”
including takeovers that were later challenged in court, by, for example, the
Lemay Sewer District. 139
CONCLUSION
A full consolidation of the city and county of St. Louis is likely to
compromise the influence of African American voters in the region, a problem
given recent racial unrest in the county municipality of Ferguson. However,
minority voting power might be preserved under a more loosely structured
merger, one in which the city and the county retain their basic governmental
structures by adopting a borough model. Precisely such a model has been
endorsed by critics of overcentralization in other cities, most notably Los
Angeles and New York, where each of the city’s five boroughs is also an
independent county, with independent county functions.
St. Louis need not follow New York’s model completely, but could
distinguish itself by establishing an even more decentralized structure presided

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 63.
BRYAN CAVE STUDY, supra note 33, at 52.
Id. (citing State v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 275 S.W.2d 255, 231–32 (1955)).
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over by a dual executive staffed by the mayor of the city and the county
executive, both of whom would control a limited number of functions—all
other responsibilities remaining with current offices as they are. Perhaps most
important, the city prosecutor and the county prosecutor would retain their
offices, and their jurisdictions.
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